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Abstract
In this paper, I provide a possible explanation of why nominally risk-free bonds are essential
in monetary economies. I argue that the role of nominal bonds is to enable agents to engage in
intertemporal exchanges of money. I show that bonds can only serve this role if they are
illiquid (costly to exchange for goods). Finally, I argue that in economies in which nominal
bonds are essential, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond to changes in the distribution
of liquidity needs.
r 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In many societies, individuals trade both money and nominal bonds. Often, as
with Treasury bills, the bonds are essentially risk-free in nominal terms, and so they
provide little beneﬁt over money itself in terms of risk sharing. Why then does a
society ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to have both money and nominally risk-free bonds? In the
language of monetary theory, why are both money and bonds essential?
In this paper, I provide an answer to this question. I show that in the equilibria of
monetary economies, individuals may have different intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution. Hence, individuals would like to engage in additional intertemporal
trades of money. I argue that the role of nominal bonds is to allow households
to make these trades. More precisely, I show that if nominal bonds exist, some
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Later, the holders of the nominal bonds can exchange them for monetary interest
rate payments. In this way, nominal bonds allow households to make intertemporal
monetary exchanges.
In making this argument, I ﬁnd that it is important to distinguish between illiquid
and liquid bonds. By illiquid, I mean bonds that cannot, because of physical or
informational reasons, be exchanged for goods. I show that illiquid bonds allow
agents to make intertemporal exchanges of money, but liquid bonds do not. In this
sense, I endogenize the illiquidity of bonds by showing that it is efﬁcient for bonds to
be illiquid rather than liquid.
I formalize these arguments in a model economy in which agents have
unobservable differences in their marginal utilities of ﬁrst-period consumption. I
look at the consequences of adding three types of durable tokens—money, liquid
bonds, and illiquid bonds—to this economy. I prove three results. The ﬁrst is that,
given the presence of money, liquid bonds are inessential; they can be eliminated
with no loss in welfare. Intuitively, liquid bonds are equivalent to money, and there is
never any reason to have both types of assets.
The second result concerns the essentiality of illiquid bonds. I show that the
unobservable tastes lead to illiquid bonds’ being essential. In particular, agents with
a high temporary need for consumption sell bonds and buy money; agents with a low
temporary need for consumption do the opposite. Intuitively, illiquid bonds provide
a way for agents with relatively low current consumption needs to credibly commit
within an asset market to forego consumption today in exchange for future
consumption.
Finally, in environments in which illiquid bonds are essential, higher nominal
interest rates may be associated with higher welfare. The last result is contrary to the
analyses of optimal monetary policy in representative agent cash-in-advance settings.
There, zero nominal interest rates are optimal, and there is an inverse relationship
between welfare and interest rates. The intuition behind my result is simple. If
illiquid bonds are essential, then adding a small amount of illiquid bonds improves
welfare. But with an increased supply of bonds relative to money, the price of bonds
has to fall. Thus, in any economy in which nominal bonds are essential, we should
expect small increases in the supply of bonds (when the supply is in the
neighborhood of zero) to lead simultaneously to higher interest rates and higher
welfare.
I derive these three results in a particular model environment. However, I argue
that they are robust. The inessentiality of liquid bonds is an arbitrage argument, and,
as such, should be true in virtually any environment. Similarly, the positive
association between welfare and interest rates when illiquid bonds are essential is a
basic demand/supply story, and again should be true in most environments. The
essentiality of illiquid bonds is more delicate: it hinges on the agents’ having different
nominal intertemporal marginal rates of substitution in a monetary equilibrium, and
these differences being difﬁcult to observe.
I also discuss the implications of my results for monetary policy. Macroeconomics
typically couches discussions of optimal monetary policy in terms of responses to
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is to allow agents to trade current liquidity for future liquidity among them-
selves. Hence, monetary policy needs to respond to variations in the beneﬁts of
liquidity exchange. These beneﬁts are shaped by distributional, not aggregate,
variables: namely, the cross-sectional distribution of liquidity holdings and liquidity
needs.
It is important not to confuse the goal of this paper with that of a related stream of
literature. There are many papers in monetary theory that ask the question: why do
individuals simultaneously hold money and bonds, even though bonds appear to
generate the same ﬂow of payments at a lower price? This question about individual
behavior is fundamentally different from my question about societal behavior. My
paper instead asks the question: given a choice between bonds that are costly to use
in goods transactions, and bonds that are not, why do societies ﬁnd it efﬁcient to use
the former? My paper endogenizes transaction costs: it shows why it is socially
optimal for interest-bearing bonds to be costlier to use in goods markets than
money is.
In the model, societies face a choice between liquid and illiquid bonds. Arguably,
this choice is similar to the United States government’s choosing whether to issue its
debt as bearer bonds or as registered bonds. With a bearer bond, possession
establishes ownership. This means that it is just as easy to exchange bearer bonds for
goods as it is to exchange them for cash in an asset market. At least along this
dimension, bearer bonds look like liquid bonds.
With registered bonds, ownership is recorded in an account. In the United States,
the appropriate records are kept either by a depository institution or by the
Treasury. These same entities can broker asset market transactions. The bundling of
record keeping and brokering implies that it is not costly to transfer ownership of a
registered bond in the process of making an asset market trade. In contrast, if an
individual tries to buy apples with a registered bond, transferring ownership of that
bond requires a lot of resources.
The asymmetry of trading costs between the goods and asset markets means that
registered bonds resemble illiquid bonds. It is worth emphasizing that all United
States government debt takes the form of registered bonds.
Of course, one could give other rationalizations for why United States government
bonds are relatively hard to exchange for goods. I do not want to choose a particular
type of illiquidity: The goal of this paper is to show that illiquidity, whatever its
source, has previously unappreciated societal beneﬁts.
I want to distinguish my paper from those that rationalize the co-existence of
money and credit (among others, Corbae and Ritter [2] and Townsend [8]). In these
papers, a barren token termed money is essential because it can be used for
transactions among strangers; simultaneously, though, it is not needed to generate
trade within enduring relationships. In a similar vein, Kocherlakota and Wallace [6]
show that in worlds with imperfect centralized recordkeeping systems, money can be
essential because it helps ﬁll the ‘‘holes’’ in the centralized recordkeeping system. In
contrast, my paper provides a rationalization of why it is essential to have two
different types of intrinsically useless tokens.
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having multiple nominally denominated assets. Aiyagari et al. [1] argue that if bonds
and money are both indivisible, then their co-existence provides societal beneﬁts. I
think of my approach as being a useful complement to theirs: while indivisibility may
well be an important factor in some situations, I doubt that it is the whole story in all
settings. In particular, in modern economies, the indivisibility of money does not
appear to be an important societal constraint.
2. Environment
I begin by describing a simple islands economy. The environment is essentially
that used by many authors to motivate a cash-in-advance monetary economy.
2.1. Physical structure
There is a unit measure of households in the environment. Each household has
two members, a consumer and a producer. The households are characterized by a
vector ði;jÞAf1;2g f H;Lg; there are equal measures of the four types of
households.
There are two types of perishable goods in the household’s setting. The ﬁrst
component of this vector describes the types of goods produced and consumed by
the household: type 1ð2Þ households produce type 1ð2Þ goods and consume type 2ð1Þ
goods. The latter two components are preference parameters. Speciﬁcally, a type
ð1;jÞ household has preferences representable by




t 1flnðctÞ aytg; ð1Þ
where ct is consumption of type 2 goods and yt is production of type 1 goods. I
assume that 0pytp1; and yH414b; and yL ¼ 1: Type ð2;jÞ households have
similar preferences with the obvious changes in goods produced and consumed.
There are three islands in the world, labelled 1, 2, and 3. At the beginning of each
period, all households are located on island 3 together. This island has no
endowment of goods or means of production. Then, the type 2ð1Þ producers go to
island 2ð1Þ and the type 1ð2Þ consumers go to island 2ð1Þ: On these islands,
production and consumption take place. All goods are perishable.
I make the following three assumptions about enforcement and information. The
ﬁrst two are standard ways to generate a role for money: I assume that there is no
recordkeeping technology (other than the durable tokens that I describe later), and I
assume that society cannot impose any penalties on households. This means, among
other things, that type 2 producers cannot be required to produce for type 1
consumers, because there is no way to force them to do so. Finally, I assume that, for
a type ði;jÞ household, i is publicly observable, but j is not.
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I investigate economies that are distinguished by the types of tokens that are
available. All of the economies have a durable and divisible token called money.
Money can be costlessly created by society (but individual households cannot do so).
The economies differ, though, in the availability of bonds. A bond is a token
which physically lasts for only one period: it physically disappears after the period 2
meeting of all households on island 3. All of the bonds are nominal: immediately
before a unit of bonds completely depreciates, the holder can exchange it for a unit
of newly created money. Thus, societies can commit to convert nominal bonds into
money, even though individuals cannot commit to repay loans. This commitment
power on the part of society plays an important role in making bonds essential.
There are two types of bonds: liquid and illiquid. A liquid bond is a bond which
can be traded on all islands at all dates. An illiquid bond can be traded only on island
3: These differences in bond type can be physically interpreted as saying that bonds
are either portable or not.
1
In what follows, I measure holdings of bonds in terms of their nominal payoff at time
of maturity. Thus, B units of one-period bonds refers to the payoff of B units of money
t h a tt h eh o l d e rr e c e i v e si np e r i o d2 .I nano-bond economy, all households begin life
with M units of money. In a liquid-bond economy, all households begin life with M
units of money and B units of liquid bonds. Finally, in an illiquid-bond economy, all
households begin life with M units of money and B units of one-period illiquid bonds.
The rules of exchange in all economies are the same. On island 3, agents trade
money, liquid bonds, and illiquid bonds in a competitive market.
2 I denote the
relative price of bonds in terms of money in this market by q: On islands 1 and 2, the
agents located on those islands trade money, liquid bonds, and goods in a
competitive market. I denote the period t relative price of goods in terms of money in
this market by pt: Thus, all of the economies are essentially cash-in-advance
economies, where cash includes both money and liquid bonds.
3. Results
In this section, I describe and prove the three main results in the paper. Note ﬁrst,
though, that because of the enforcement and recordkeeping limitations, money itself
is essential in all economies.
1Following the discussion of registered bonds in the introduction, illiquid bonds need not be durable
tokens. Alternatively, there could be a record on the central island 3. Each person begins life with a credit
of B units in this record; if they enter period 2 with B0 units in the record, they receive B0 units of money.
(Obviously, this requires that people are distinguishable.)
For this record to function just like illiquid bonds, we need two key restrictions. First, agents cannot go
negative in terms of their credit record. The idea here is that while agents can credibly establish their
identities, they can disappear so that the planner cannot ﬁnd them to collect. Second, the record is not
accessible from islands 1 and 2.
I thank the associate editor for this (more realistic) re-interpretation.
2The restriction to competitive trade is not innocuous; see [9].
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The ﬁrst result is that any equilibrium allocation in the liquid-bond economy is an
equilibrium allocation in the no-bond economy. This is easily demonstrated through
arbitrage. In the liquid-bond economy, to avoid arbitrage opportunities, the relative
price of money and bonds must be one in both goods and asset markets in periods 1
and 2. Suppose this were not so. In the period 1 goods market on either island 1 or
island 2, there is a positive supply of bonds and money. If the relative price of bonds
in terms of money is less (more) than one, then all households will hold only bonds
(money). Hence, the relative price must be one. But this kind of argument can be
unraveled backwards to prove that the relative prices must be always be one. Given
this is true, we can replace all bonds with an equivalent amount of money, and the
liquid-bond equilibrium will then be a no-bond equilibrium.
The intuition behind this argument is clear. If bonds are as liquid as money, then
people will only hold money if nominal interest rates are zero. But then the bonds
can just be replaced by money: there is no difference between the two instruments at
all.
Despite (because of?) its simplicity, the implications of the result are strong:
adding nominal bonds to a monetary economy only improves welfare if those bonds
are at least somewhat less liquid than money. Any essentiality of nominal bonds can
be traced directly to their (relative) illiquidity.
3.2. Essentiality of illiquid bonds
The second main result concerns the essentiality of illiquid bonds. I construct
equilibria in the no-bond economy and the illiquid-bond economy. I demonstrate
that welfare is higher in the latter equilibrium. Throughout, I assume that b4a: As
we shall see, this assumption serves to eliminate the inﬂationary distortion on
household labor supply, which makes welfare comparisons more straightforward.
3.2.1. No-bond economy
In the no-bond economy, if fptg
N
t¼1 is the sequence of price levels, a type ði;jÞ















Here, cjt is consumption in period t; yjt is production in period t; and Mjt is
moneyholdings in period t: Because of the spatial separation in the environment,
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goods in period t: This ‘‘cash-in-advance’’ restriction is embedded in the set of
constraints in the household’s problem.
It is then straightforward to show that the following is an equilibrium:
pt ¼ M for all t;
cjt ¼ 1 for all t;j;
yjt ¼ 1 for all t;j:
(My choice of numeraire rules out the equilibrium in which money is not valued at
all.) In the appendix, I prove that this is the unique equilibrium for any yH: I also
allow for the possibility that in the no-bond economy, the government injects
additional money into the economy at the beginning of every period via equal
transfers for all households.
3 I show that for any weakly increasing sequence of
money supplies fMtg
N
t¼1; and any yH; the equilibrium allocation of resources is given
by
cjt ¼ yjt ¼ minða 1bMt=Mtþ1;1Þ for all t and j ¼ H;L ð2Þ
which provides no more utility to the households than the equilibrium obtained for
the constant-money case.
4
Because they are liquidity constrained, households both consume the same
amount of consumption in period 1: Note that this is not consistent with a ﬁrst-best
allocation, in which yH households would consume more in period 1 than the other
households.
The unobservability of the households’ tastes plays an important role here. If
tastes were observable, the social planner could give ðyH   1ÞM additional units of
money to the type H households before trading begins. In the resulting monetary
equilibrium, type H households consume 2yH=ð1 þ yHÞ in period 1, and consume 1
in all following periods. This consumption allocation is Pareto optimal (it solves a
planner’s problem in which the planner weights all agents equally).
3.2.2. Illiquid-bond economy
In the illiquid-bond economy, if q is the relative price between bonds and money in
period 1; and fptg
N
t¼1 is the sequence of price levels, type ði;jÞ households face the
3Lump-sum taxes of money are impossible because society cannot impose any penalties on households.
(If such penalties could be imposed, then there is clearly no role for money, because producers could just
be forced to produce for households.)
Even without these penalties, it might be possible to impose proportional taxes on money holdings (if
money is a depreciable token or if money produced at different dates is distinguishable). But such
proportional taxes are neutral.
4In [7], the socially optimal allocation of resources is an equilibrium if the money supply grows
sufﬁciently fast. This is not true in this setting. Intuitively, even though the low-shock households are more
patient than the high-shock households, the low-shock households are still impatient (in the sense that, at
their endowments, their shadow real interest rates are positive). It is therefore not possible to separate the
two types by using inﬂationary policy as in [7].
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This decision problem represents the sequence of markets that households face. In
period 1, households can trade money and bonds at price q: Then, consumers take
the available money (bonds are illiquid) and buy goods. In period 2, households can
use the money balances and the payments from bonds to buy goods. From period 3
on, the decision problem is the same as in the no-bond economy.
Given this decision problem, it is straightforward to show that the following is an
equilibrium for sufﬁciently small B:
yjt ¼ 1 for all j;t; ð3Þ
q ¼ bM=ðM þ bB þ 2BÞ; ð4Þ
p1 ¼ M; ð5Þ
pt ¼ð M þ BÞ;t41; ð6Þ
ch1 ¼ð M þ BqÞ=M; ð7Þ
cl1 ¼ð M   BqÞ=M; ð8Þ
ch2 ¼ M=ðM þ BÞ; ð9Þ
cl2 ¼ð M þ 2BÞ=ðM þ BÞ; ð10Þ
cj2 ¼ 1;t42: ð11Þ
Let me explain how this equilibrium works. In period 1, on island 3, type H agents
sell all of their illiquid bonds at price q to the type L agents. Because they have more
cash, the type H agents can consume more in period 1 than type L households (note
that the type L households end up carrying both bonds and money into period 2). All
households work the full amount possible, because they are at a corner; hence, they
all carry the same amount of money into the next period.
In period 2, on island 3, the type L agents receive the payoff from their illiquid
bonds. Hence, they can consume more in period 2 than the type H agents. Again, in
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agents consume the same amount.
It is straightforward to show that all agents are made better off in this equilibrium
than in the no-bond equilibrium allocation. In particular, it is budget-feasible for the
agents to spend M in period 1; and then spend ðM þ BÞ in period 2. This means that
the no-bond equilibrium allocation is budget feasible in the illiquid-bond economy,
but agents strictly prefer not to choose it.
Thus, in this model environment, all agents are made better off by the introduction
of illiquid bonds. Both illiquid bonds and money are essential.
5
The economics underlying this result are simple. At their endowments, agents
have two different shadow real interest rates. It follows that they want to
engage in an intertemporal consumption trade. To do so, they must trade an
asset that pays a rate of return which is intermediate to their shadow real
interest rates. Money does not work: its real rate of return is no more than zero,
and all agents’ shadow interest rates are positive. The agents need another asset
with a positive return. It follows that there is a role in this economy for illiquid
bonds.
The result is reminiscent of Woodford [10]. Woodford shows that in an economy
with borrowing-constrained agents, efﬁcient outcomes require issuing a positive
amount of public debt. The important innovation here is that I show explicitly that
the relevant bonds must be illiquid to offer a welfare beneﬁt over what agents can do
with money alone.
3.3. Welfare beneﬁts of high nominal interest rates
Now consider increasing the supply B of bonds in the above illiquid-bond
economy. If B increases slightly, then, since:
q ¼ bM=ðð2 þ bÞB þ MÞ
q falls as B rises. Moreover, household welfare is increasing in B (at least) for small
values of B: It follows that as M=B varies, interest rates and household welfare move
in the same direction.
4. Discussion
In this section, I discuss three aspects of the results: the intuition underlying them,
their implications for monetary policy, and their robustness to adding other forms of
wealth, like claims to physical capital.
5Note that it would make agents even better off to allow them to trade one-period illiquid bonds on
island 3 every period, not just in period 1.
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Here, I provide intuition for the three results. The ﬁrst result is that liquid bonds
are inessential. The intuition behind this result is that if bonds are liquid, then their
price must always be the same as money, or bond/money markets cannot clear.
Hence, money and bonds are exactly equivalent instruments—there is no need to
distinguish between the two. This arbitrage-based result seems likely to be highly
robust.
The second result is that illiquid bonds are essential. This result is more delicate,
because it depends on three frictions. The ﬁrst is that enforcement be limited. If there
are no enforcement frictions, agents can borrow and lend among themselves without
the outside supply of illiquid bonds. We know from Kocherlakota [5] and Huggett
and Krasa [3], though, that without some enforcement frictions, money itself is
inessential.
The second friction is that recordkeeping must be limited. Otherwise, private
credit could be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a gift-giving game [5]. Again,
as Kocherlakota [5] emphasizes, without recordkeeping limitations of some kind,
money itself is inessential.
Finally, the households’ shadow interest rates (at their endowments) must be
positive and different. The households would like to eliminate this difference. They
cannot use money to do so (because their shadow interest rates are positive). More
strongly, because of the above enforcement/recordkeeping limitations, they can only
do so by using bonds.
There is a counterintuitive element to the essentiality of illiquid bonds:
why are households better off using a less ﬂexible asset? The reason is simple.
Households wish to engage in an intertemporal exchange of consumption. Because
of spatial separation, they can only engage in these trades in the asset market.
So, in the asset market, a type L household must guarantee that it is giving up
ﬁrst-period consumption in exchange for more second period consumption. The
only way that they can do so is by buying bonds that are not as liquid as
money.
Again, the intuition behind this result seems fairly robust. In particular, I
conjecture that it will survive other ways of introducing differences in liquidity
demands across model entities. (For example, the result should be true in a setting
with ﬁrms that need money to hire inputs into production, and that differ in terms of
productivity shocks.)
The ﬁnal result is that in the illiquid-bond economy, for B=M small, larger bond
supplies are associated with higher period 1 nominal interest rates and with
higher levels of household welfare. Again, there is a simple (and robust)
intuition behind this result. In an economy in which illiquid bonds are essential,
adding a small amount of illiquid bonds makes agents better off (by deﬁnition). But
increasing the supply of bonds will typically drive their price downwards, and
increase the nominal interest rate. Hence, if illiquid bonds are essential, then higher
nominal interest rates should be expected to be associated with higher levels of
welfare.
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Understanding why bonds and money are both essential has important
consequences for our understanding of monetary policy.
6 Monetary policy in the
above economy is about adjusting the relative supply of money and bonds. If B=M is
small, the type H agents are borrowing-constrained. By increasing B=M; the
planner/government essentially endows the agents with claims to future consump-
tion. Hence, increases in B=M loosens the borrowing constraint on type H agents.
Once a sufﬁcient amount of bonds is injected, the borrowing constraint is
implicitly eliminated. In equilibrium, the agents’ marginal rates of substitution are
equated, and the allocation is Pareto optimal. There is then no effect from injecting
any more bonds (until B=M is so large that the resulting inﬂation distorts labor
supply).
7
This thinking has major positive and normative consequences for monetary
policy. In the islands economy studied above, prices are fully ﬂexible. Moreover,
inﬂation is basically a lump-sum tax when a is small, and so bond supply increases
are Ricardian. Nonetheless, monetary policy can affect the real interest rate.
Shrinking the money supply (or expanding the supply of bonds) loosens the
borrowing constraint. Looser borrowing constraints means that there is more
demand for loans, which drives up real interest rates.
Normatively, macroeconomists typically think about how monetary policy should
respond to aggregate variables.
8 The above analysis indicates that it is optimal for
open market operations to respond to distributional changes. Consider an extension
of the above economy, in which the planner can condition B=M on the realization of
6As above, I assume in this subsection that agents are initially endowed with bonds. However, the
qualitative effects of monetary policy are the same if the monetary authority injects bonds by pegging a
nominal interest rate instead.
7In particular, there is a cutoff value ðyH   1Þ=ð2b þ 2Þ: If B=M is less than this cutoff, then the type H
agents are borrowing-constrained, and the equilibrium consumption allocation is determined as in (7)–
(11). On the other hand, if B=M is at least as large as the cutoff:
cH1 ¼ 2ð1 þ bÞ=ð2 þ b þ b=yHÞ;
cH2 ¼ by
 1
H ð1 þ rÞcH1;
cHt ¼ 1;t42;
cLt ¼ 2   cHt for all t;
where r ¼ð 2yHb
 1   2bÞ=ð1 þ yH þ 2bÞ is the real interest rate between periods 1 and 2. (These formulae
assume that B=M is above the cutoff value, but is not sufﬁciently large so as to create an inﬂation
distortion in labor supply.)
When B=M exceeds the cutoff value, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. However, it solves a
planner’s problem which puts less weight on the type H agents than the type L agents. In fact, for values of
B=M near to, but smaller than, the cutoff value, the type H agents’ welfare is decreasing in B=M:
8Assuming, as is true in this economy, that the Friedman Rule is not attainable because the money
supply cannot be reduced through lump-sum transfers.
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Pareto optimal allocations.
More generally, this explanation for the co-existence of money and bonds implies
that monetary policy’s goal is to correct mismatches between liquidity holdings and
liquidity needs. If the mismatch between holdings and needs is large, then the
monetary authority should ease borrowing constraints by shrinking the money
supply and expanding the amount of bonds.
4.3. Other forms of wealth
In actual economies, money and bonds are not the only forms of wealth. People
also trade claims to the rental income from physical capital and land. To what extent
does the above analysis survive in the presence of these other claims?
The answer to this question depends crucially on the additional claims’ liquidity
and risk characteristics. In the above model economy, illiquid bonds are nominally
riskless, are costlessly tradeable in asset markets, and are costly to trade in goods
markets. If there are ﬁnancial assets which share these same characteristics, then
there is no additional role for illiquid bonds.
In the world, there is reason to suspect that other ﬁnancial assets are not as
liquid as Treasury bills (or other United States government debt). Other
ﬁnancial assets tend to have much higher risk-adjusted returns than Treasury
bills. These extra returns are often attributed to Treasury bills’ being more liquid
(see [4]).
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to provide a rationalization of the co-existence of
illiquid bonds and money. The key ingredients in this rationalization are twofold.
First, enforcement is limited, and recordkeeping is impossible except through
durable tokens. Second, households have unobservable differences in tastes that lead
to a difference in their willingness to substitute money over time. Together, these
frictions give rise to a need for an auxiliary illiquid durable token.
The paper shows that in economies in which illiquid bonds are essential, standard
welfare analyses of monetary policy must be revised. Adjustments in the supply of
money relative to the supply of bonds have important allocational effects.
Speciﬁcally, an important consequence of shrinking the money supply is that
individual borrowing constraints are loosened. This drives up real interest
rates (even without sticky prices or inﬂation tax effects) and (as long as inﬂationary
effects on output are small) makes agents better off.
This paper represents a ﬁrst step toward understanding the social beneﬁts of
having assets that differ in their liquidity properties. It would be useful to extend the
analysis to account for ﬁner gradations of liquidity. I plan to address this question in
future work.
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Appendix
In this appendix, I consider an extended version of the no-bonds economy
presented in the text. I allow for the possibility that at the beginning of every period,
households receive equal non-negative transfers of new money. I show that for any
weakly increasing sequence of money supplies, there is a unique monetary
equilibrium in the no-bond islands economy.
The proof works as follows. I ﬁrst show that there is a unique equilibrium in the
case in which yH ¼ 1: I then build on this lemma to prove that there is a unique
equilibrium for all yH:
Lemma 1. Let fMtg
N
t¼0 be a weakly increasing sequence of money supplies. If yH ¼ 1;
there is a unique equilibrium in which cjt ¼ yjt ¼ minða 1bMt=Mtþ1;1Þ; and pt ¼
Mt=cjt for all t:
Proof. It is straightforward to show that any equilibrium must be symmetric in that
all households have the same consumption-labor choices.
The ﬁrst part of the proof is that in equilibrium, if the multiplier on the
household’s cash-in-advance constraint is zero in any period t; then it must be zero in
all future periods. Let lt be the multiplier on the household’s period t ﬂow wealth
constraint, and mt be the multiplier on its period t cash-in-advance constraint.
Suppose mt ¼ 0 for s4tXt and ms40: Then
b





t s ¼ ptct=MspMt=Ms;
which contradicts the speciﬁcation that the money supply is weakly increasing.
The second part of the proof is that if mt ¼ 0 for all tXT; then the household’s
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that
ptct ¼ Mt
for all t; and so all households consume the same amount in every period. Moreover,
the households’ labor supply ﬁrst-order condition looks like
  a þ bpt=ðptþ1ctþ1Þ
¼  a þ bMt=ðMtþ1ctÞ:
If apbMt=ðMtþ1Þ; then ct ¼ 1: If a4bMt=Mtþ1; then ct ¼ a 1bMt=Mtþ1: Hence, in
equilibrium, yt ¼ minða 1bMt=Mtþ1;1Þ for all t: &
The lemma (and its proof) can be used to prove the proposition that for any yH;
there is a unique monetary equilibrium, and in that equilibrium, the cash-in-advance
constraint always binds.
Proposition 1. Let fMtg
N
t¼0 be a weakly increasing sequence of money supplies. Then,
for all yH; there is a unique equilibrium in which for all j;t:
cjt ¼ yjt ¼ minða 1bMt=Mtþ1;1Þ;
pt ¼ Mt=cjt:
Proof. Consider ﬁrst an equilibrium in which, in period 1, the cash-in-advance
constraint binds type L households. Then, the type L household’s solution to its
choice problem satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions of the type H household’s problem,
and therefore also solves the type H household’s problem. It follows that the cash-in-
advance constraint binds type H households in period 1: From Lemma 1, we know
that in any such equilibrium, the cash-in-advance constraint binds both types of
households in all periods (because they begin period 2 with equal amounts of
money). Hence, we know that the only equilibrium in which the cash-in-advance
constraint binds type L households in period 1 has cjt ¼ yjt ¼ minða 1bMt=Mtþ1;1Þ:
Now, I prove that there is no equilibrium in which the cash-in-advance constraint
fails to bind type L households in period 1: Consider such an equilibrium. From the
logic in the proof of Lemma 1, the cash-in-advance constraint must eventually bind
type L households (or their transversality conditions are not satisﬁed). Suppose the
cash-in-advance constraint binds ﬁrst in period s: Then, again using logic from the
proof of Lemma 1, we know that:
1=ðp1cL1Þ¼lL1 ¼ lLs þ mLs ¼ b
s 1=ðpscLsÞ¼b
s 1=MLs:
Moreover, because of their preferences, type L households spend no more in period 1
than type H households, and therefore MHspMLs: It follows that MLs4M0: But
this implies that M0op1cL1; which violates the cash-in-advance constraint. It follows
that there is no such equilibrium. &
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